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—  Brexit will have an immediate effect on about 14% of all EWCs because they are based 
on UK national law.
— There are also UK representatives in more than 70% of EWCs.
—  By 2018, most UK-based EWCs had already discussed the impact of Brexit. However, 
almost half of the EWCs with UK representatives had not yet discussed what will 
happen.
—  Of those EWCs with UK representatives, most think the UK members will remain 
members of the EWC, quite a few do not know, and about 16% predict that they will 
not remain members.
–
 Policy pointers 
Introduction
On 31 January 2020, at 23:00, the United Kingdom (UK) officially 
ceased to be a member of the European Union (EU). A few days 
prior, on 28 January, the UK had also formally withdrawn from the 
European Economic Area. Brexit had finally happened. 
However, in practical terms, nothing much has changed yet. January 
2020 marked the beginning of an 11-month transition period 
during which an encompassing post-Brexit trade deal between the 
EU and the UK should be negotiated. At the end of the transition 
period (31 January 2021) the UK will become a ‘third country’. 
At the centre of these negotiations will be the question of what 
constitutes a ‘level playing field’, meaning the set of common rules 
and standards that ensure fair and open competition between 
businesses in the UK and the EU. 
A commitment to maintain this level playing field is laid down in 
the (non-binding) political declaration of October 2019 which sets 
out the framework for the future relationship between the EU 
and the UK (EU and UK 2020): ‘The Parties should […] maintain 
environmental, social and employment standards at the current 
high levels provided by the existing common standards.’ 
The EU has made it clear that a level playing field must be maintained 
with respect to workers’ rights, environmental protection, taxation 
and state aids for businesses. Yet UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson 
has insisted on the UK’s right to diverge or move away from EU 
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rules and regulations. At the time of writing, it is entirely unclear 
what solutions, if any, will be found. 
One of the many areas that will likely be directly affected with 
regard to workers’ rights is the organisation and functioning 
of European Works Councils (EWCs). EWCs are company-level 
institutions set up in multinational companies (MNCs) to enable 
the provision of information to and consultation of employees on 
transnational matters. In EWCs, the central management of an 
MNC meets with employee representatives on a regular basis to 
discuss company strategy, employment issues and much more (De 
Spiegelaere and Jagodziński 2015, 2019).
Since their inception, over 1400 EWCs have been established, and 
approximately 1000 are in operation today (EWCdb.eu, April 2020), 
regularly bringing together employee representatives from different 
Member States of the EU and the European Economic Area (De 
Spiegelaere and Jagodziński 2015). EWCs are an (albeit imperfect) 
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embodiment of social Europe as they provide an essential platform 
for employee representatives from all Member States to cooperate 
in order to defend the interests of the workforce across Europe, 
and because the law obliges management to discuss transnational 
employment matters with them. 
Because EWCs are established in multinational companies, the 
regulatory framework for their functioning is laid down in EU 
directives which have been transposed into the national law of 
each Member State (Jagodziński 2015). 
But what happens if a Member State leaves the EU? A notice of 
the European Commission of 21 April 2020, sets out to provide 
clarity (European Commission 2020). According to this ‘notice to 
stakeholders’, an impact can be expected in different areas: 
1.  The UK will no longer be included in the calculations regarding 
the employee thresholds that determine whether a company 
falls within the scope of the EWC Directive, and this might 
impact some EWCs as they would no longer be subject to the 
rights and obligations stemming from it;
2.  The UK representatives will be considered as third-country 
representatives in EWCs ;
3.  Companies whose central management or representative agent 
is in the UK will need to assign another representative agent 
in the EU;
4.  It is highly recommended that in agreements establishing EWCs 
which refer to UK legislation, the applicable law be changed 
to that of another EU Member State;
5.  There might be an impact on the composition of SNBs as the 
UK employees will be disregarded from the calculations; and
6.  Brexit might lead to significant structural changes in some 
companies, which would thus require a full renegotiation of 
the existing EWC agreements. 
In many EWCs, the impact of Brexit has already been discussed and 
in some cases largely resolved. For example, the EWC agreements 
at Ardo, Asahi ASL, General Electric, Korian, LafargeHolcim, UTC, 
Cargill, Yildiz Holding, Total, Coca-Cola, Bombardier, Rockwell 
Collins, Kuehne and Nagel, and Westinghouse have introduced 
clauses stating that UK representatives will continue to be members 
of the EWC even after Brexit has happened. In other companies, 
however, such as Centroteck, Lactalis and EPH, it was decided 
that representatives of the UK workforces would not or no longer 
be members of the EWC. 
The European trade union federations distributed joint 
recommendations to the EWCs regarding Brexit (EFBWW et 
al. 2018, 2020). Among other things, these recommendations 
urged EWCs to: 
– start discussions on the issue of Brexit as soon as possible;
–  secure the rights of UK representatives by explicitly including 
them in the scope of the EWC’s activities beyond 2020;
–  ensure legal certainty by already choosing and applying an 
alternative legislation if the EWC is governed by UK law; and
–  check if the company will still fulfil the employment threshold 
to qualify for setting up an EWC. 
This policy brief contributes to this discussion and debate 
by providing insights from within the EWCs themselves. The 
European Trade Union Institute’s (ETUI) large-scale survey of 
EWC representatives conducted between January and May 2018 
(De Spiegelaere and Jagodziński 2019) sheds some light on how 
likely it is that EWCs will be affected by Brexit, whether they have 
already discussed its potential impact, and what EWC members 
think will happen to the UK representatives in their EWC. 
How many EWCs will be affected?
In the EWC survey, the EWC representatives were asked several 
questions about Brexit and their EWC. It must be emphasised 
that it is not individual EWC members but rather an EWC as a 
whole that may need to negotiate a new legal basis or clarify the 
future status of its UK representatives. In this analysis, therefore, 
the answers of the individual EWC members are aggregated to 
represent their EWC as a whole. Furthermore, the percentages are 
weighted in order to better reflect the total EWC population. In 
summary, the figures in the table below should be interpreted as 
follows (to take the first example): 15.9% of all EWCs say the UK 
is home to the European or global headquarters of their company. 
Table 1 provides the results of the EWC survey regarding those 
questions that help to assess the possible impact of Brexit in terms 
of (1) companies with their headquarters (HQ) in the UK, (2) EWCs 
that are based on UK legislation, (3) EWCs with UK representatives, 
and (4) EWCs with a membership which might fall short of the 
thresholds of the directive as a result of Brexit. 
As can be seen, a significant minority of the EWCs will be directly 
affected by Brexit as they have their HQ in the UK (15.9%) or are 
based on UK legislation in terms of how they function (15.2%)1. 
In line with the notice of the Commission, these companies and 
EWCs will need to assign a different representative agent for the 
former and applicable law for the latter.
However, many more EWCs will be affected because they have 
UK employee representatives. According to the EWC survey, this 
is true for no less than 70.2% of the EWCs (this aspect will be 
discussed in more detail in Part 3). 
Lastly, only a few companies (according to the EWC representatives) 
will no longer comply with the directive’s minimum threshold of at 
least 1000 employees employed within the EU and 150 employees 
in at least two EU Member States after Brexit. According to the 
EWC representatives, this would only be the case for 4.0% of the 
EWCs surveyed. 
Table 1 shows that quite a lot of EWCs will be directly (due to the 
location of HQ or the applicability of UK law) or indirectly (due 
to the presence of UK representatives) affected by Brexit. It is 
thus vital that Brexit be discussed in the EWCs. According to EWC 
representatives, management had discussed the possible impact of 
1   This observation is in line with previous ETUI findings that drew on an 
analysis of EWC agreements in 2017 to observe that 12.4% of EWCs are 
based on UK law (ETUC and ETUI 2017). 
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Brexit in only about 40% of the EWCs (in early 2018). According 
to 53.7% of the EWCs, the issue had not yet been raised at all, 
and there was no response from 6.3% of the EWCs. 
On the positive side, EWCs established in MNCs headquartered 
in the UK and/or EWCs based on UK legislation are more likely to 
have discussed Brexit than those that do not have such a direct 
connection to the UK2, indicating that those EWCs which are 
directly affected by Brexit are more likely to discuss it beforehand. 
Similarly, EWCs with UK representatives were much more likely to 
have discussed Brexit than those without (52.6% versus 11.1%). While 
it is positive that EWCs with UK representatives are more likely to 
have discussed the issue, it is also worrying that on the eve of Brexit 
only slightly more than one in two EWCs with UK representatives 
had discussed the issue. It is vital that the UK representatives know 
what their status will be after Brexit in the EWC. 
Will UK representatives still be 
welcome in the EWC?
The main question is what will happen to the UK representatives who 
are currently active in EWCs. The declared policy of the (European) 
trade unions is to insist that UK representatives remain members 
of the EWCs even after the UK leaves the EU. Currently, quite some 
EWCs have non-EU members such as employee representatives 
from Switzerland, Norway or Turkey. The UK representatives could 
obtain a similar status as third-country employee representatives 
(European Commission 2020). 
History also indicates that this is probable. Although the UK joined 
the EWC framework at a later date (Directive 97/74/EC entered 
into force in 1999), most EWCs had already decided to include 
their UK representatives as members prior to that date. Only eight 
agreements were found which explicitly excluded the UK from the 
EWC coverage (ETUC and ETUI 2017). 
However, whether UK representatives can remain members of an 
EWC is clearly not just a technical issue. It is also a matter of principle; 
the idea of transnational solidarity means that when workers talk to 
2   Of those EWCs in UK-headquartered companies, 61.4% said they had 
discussed the issue versus 37% of those with another headquarters. Of 
those with UK legislation as applicable law for the EWC, 63.4% said 
they had already discussed the issue versus 36.1% of those with another 
applicable law. 
central management, they do so as representatives of all workers. 
As long as the company is still operating in the UK, excluding the 
UK representatives would effectively divide the European workforce 
and erode European-level employee voice in the company. 
In the survey, the EWC representatives were asked whether they 
thought the UK representatives would remain members of the EWC 
after Brexit (Table 2). The overall picture is mixed. Based only on 
those EWCs with UK representatives, the results show that almost 
one in four (21.7%) EWCs indicated that they did not know whether 
the UK representatives would be able to retain their membership. 
The majority (62.2%) assumed that the UK representatives would 
remain members. However, a significant minority (16.2%) said 
that the UK representatives would no longer be invited to EWC 
meetings after Brexit. 














Total 16.2% 62.2% 21.7% 247*
BE 4.1% 63.2% 32.7% 16
FI 0.0% 74.3% 25.7% 12
FR 23.6% 65.0% 11.4% 37
DE 16.8% 57.0% 26.2% 43
NL 26.3% 60.5% 13.3% 17
SE 7.4% 72.0% 20.6% 13
UK 0.0% 80.7% 19.3% 18
CH 26.1% 45.2% 28.7% 18




13.5% 60.4% 26.1% 16
Source: European Works Councils and SE works council survey 2018 
* These are the HQ countries of companies, yet only includes those 
countries in which more than 10 EWCs with UK representatives 
replied.






The global or European headquarters of my company is in the UK 81.6% 15.9% 2.5% 365
The applicable national law of our EWC agreement is UK law 78.9% 15.2% 6.0% 365
There are employee representatives from the UK on my EWC 70.2% 27.2% 2.5% 365
After the UK leaves the EU, my company will no longer comply with the terms of the EWC 
Directive as it will no longer employ enough employees in different European countries 88.7% 4.0% 7.3% 365
Source: European Works Councils and SE works council survey 2018. For more information see De Spiegelaere and Jagodziński (2019)
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Representatives from companies who have their headquarters in 
the UK were much more likely to say that the UK representatives 
will stay members of the EWC, along with representatives from 
companies headquartered in Finland and Sweden. At the lower end 
were representatives from companies headquartered in Switzerland: 
of those, only a minority thought that the UK representatives would 
remain members of the EWCs (Table 2). Similarly, it seems more 
likely that UK representatives will not continue to be members 
in EWCs with over 15 members than in EWCs which count fewer 
members. Additionally, of those EWCs who had already discussed 
the issue explicitly with the management, about three in four said 
the UK representatives would remain members. Of those who 
had not yet discussed the issue, this was only one in two, with 
significantly more EWCs saying that they did not know yet or that 
the UK representatives could not stay after Brexit. 
What this signals is that those EWCs who depend on the UK 
representatives in order to function (because they are headquartered 
there, because most of the employees are there, or because there 
are only a few representatives in general) opt more often to keep 
the UK representatives in the EWCs compared to EWCs where UK 
representatives only play a small role in the EWC. 
Conclusions
In summary, based on a large-scale survey of EWC representatives 
conducted in early 2018, we observe that about 15% to 16% of 
EWCs will be directly affected by Brexit because their companies 
are headquartered in the UK and/or their EWCs are based on 
UK legislation. When Brexit is completed (or, at the latest, after 
the transition period has expired), they will be obliged to change 
their legislative base and assign a different representative agent 
in the EU.
Many more EWCs, however, will be affected because they have 
UK representatives in their EWC. This is the case for over 70% 
of EWCs. These EWCs will face the question of whether or not to 
keep the UK representatives once the UK leaves the EU, and if so, 
to ensure that there is an adequate legal basis for EWC members 
from the UK to exercise their rights. 
Quite a large proportion of EWCs have already raised this issue with 
the management, mostly those that are headquartered in the UK 
or have UK national law as their legal basis. However, as many as 
one in two EWCs with UK members had not yet discussed the issue 
by early 2018 even though Brexit seemed imminent at that time. 
Of those EWCs which have UK representatives, most indicated that 
they would remain EWC members even after the UK leaves the EU, 
while nearly one in six EWCs reported that the UK representatives 
would cease to be members. Surprisingly, as late as 2018 quite a 
few EWCs had not yet found an answer to the question of whether 
the UK will continue to be represented on their EWC. 
This policy brief shows that the potential impact of Brexit on 
EWCs is not to be underestimated. Most EWCs will, in some way, 
need to address the consequences of Brexit. On the bright side, 
EWCs are discussing the issue and most have decided that UK 
representatives can stay on boards, even after the UK leaves the 
EU. But in a considerable minority of EWCs, the UK representatives 
might lose their mandate. This would be a great loss for workers 
and the effective representation of their interests as well as a blow 
to transnational solidarity and, more broadly, democracy at work.
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